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I. LEGAL NUMERACY: A MANIFESTO 
Truth routinely manifests itself by mathematical means. Many 
(perhaps most) things can be measured and expressed numerically.  
Of all the miracles available for inspection, none is more striking than the 
fact that the real world may be understood in terms of the real numbers, 
time and space and flesh and blood and dense primitive throbbings 
sustained somehow and brought to life by a network of secret 
mathematical nerves. . . .1  
Just as law uses words to breathe life into “the enterprise of 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules,”2 “[n]ature 
talks to us in the language of mathematics.”3 This symposium, Legal 
Quanta, demonstrates several distinct applications of mathematics to 
law and the use of quantitative techniques to model, describe, and 
predict legal phenomena. 
                                                 
 † Cf. EDWIN A. ABBOTT, FLATLAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS 
(1884). 
 * Justin Smith Morrill Chair in Law, Michigan State University; Of 
Counsel, Technology Law Group of Washington, D.C. Special thanks to Heather 
Elaine Worland Chen. 
 1. DAVID BERLINSKI, A TOUR OF THE CALCULUS, at xiii (1995). 
 2. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 122 (rev. ed. 1969). 
 3. Peter Hilton, The Mathematical Component of a Good Education, in 
MISCELLANEA MATHEMATICA 145, 149 (Peter Hilton, Friedrich Hirzebruch & 
Reinhold Remmert eds., 1991); accord Peter Hilton, Foreword: Mathematics in Our 
Culture, in JAN GULLBERG, MATHEMATICS: FROM THE BIRTH OF NUMBERS, at xvii-
xxii (1997). 
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Admittedly, “[i]t is an open secret that lawyers,” including 
those who teach rather than practice for a living, (stereo)typically 
“don’t like math.”4 In a legal culture whose leaders shamelessly 
confess their ignorance of the “fine details of molecular biology,”5 
lawyers and their teachers run a dire risk of falling behind “the 
extraordinary rate of scientific and other technological advances that 
figure increasingly in litigation” and, for that matter, in daily life.6 
American law labors under an “extraordinary condition . . . which 
makes it possible for [someone] without any knowledge of even the 
rudiments of chemistry to pass upon” scientifically or 
technologically sophisticated questions.7 The legal academy should 
aspire to a level of “numeracy,” one that is “less about numbers per 
se and more about statistical inference or how to interpret and 
understand scientific . . . studies.”8 
Innumeracy is flatly unacceptable.9 Indeed, a mastery of basic 
mathematical concepts should serve as a prerequisite to attain 
membership in the legal academy. As a group that not only digests 
but also delivers postmodern criticism,10 legal scholars can surely 
grasp mathematics, which after all is merely another branch of 
philosophy.11 Notwithstanding their profession’s reputation for 
                                                 
 4. Lisa Milot, Illuminating Innumeracy, 63 CASE W. L. REV. 769, 769 
(2013). 
 5. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I 
join the judgment of the Court, and all of its opinion except Part I-A and some 
portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine details of molecular biology. I am 
unable to affirm those details on my own knowledge or even my own belief.”). 
 6. Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 7. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 
1911). 
 8. Edward K. Cheng, Fighting Legal Innumeracy, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 271, 
272 (2014). 
 9. See generally JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL 
ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2d ed. 2001). 
 10. Cf. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, 
RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989). 
 11. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN 
CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 7 (2015), 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/OED_GRB.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR66-
Z8N5] (describing mathematics as a philosophical discipline and therefore 
insufficient by itself to satisfy the technical training requirement for eligibility to 
take the Patent and Trademark Office examination); see also 37 C.F.R. § 
11.7(a)(2)(ii) (2010) (requiring practitioners before the USPTO to “[p]ossess[] the 
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quantitative ineptitude, mathematical thinking should come naturally 
to legal academics. As social scientists who have nurtured 
“something like a third culture” between science and literature in 
order to improve the circumstances under which real “human beings 
are living,”12 legal academics enjoy a special opportunity to unite the 
literary culture’s “canon of works and expressive techniques” with 
the scientific culture’s “guiding principles of quantitative thought 
and strict logic.”13 At their best, legal scholars as social scientists 
bridge all of contemporary civilization’s intellectual subcultures.14 
II. LEGAL QUANTA: A SYMPOSIUM 
On October 29, 2015, the Michigan State Law Review 
convened a day-long symposium called Legal Quanta. Although this 
symposium by no means exhausted all applications of mathematics 
to law, its seven papers illustrate four distinct variations on this 
theme: empirical legal analysis, machine learning, legal networks, 
and analytical modeling. 
The first of those themes, the application of empirical methods 
to discrete legal problems, is perhaps the most familiar and deeply 
rooted form of mathematically informed legal scholarship. More than 
a century after Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that “the man of the 
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics,”15 and 
three decades after Richard Posner celebrated the decline of law as 
an autonomous discipline,16 the primacy of empiricism in the 
contemporary legal academy lies beyond dispute. Indeed, the last 
half-century has witnessed the rise of the Ph.D. as the leading 
credential for law school professors.17 
                                                                                                       
legal, scientific, and technical qualifications necessary . . . to render . . . valuable 
service” to patent and trademark applicants). 
 12. C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES: A SECOND LOOK 70 (2d ed. 1965). 
 13. Frank Wilczek, The Third Culture, 424 NATURE 997, 997 (2003). 
 14. See Jim Chen, The Midas Touch, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH., at i, ii 
(2005); cf. Cultural Divides, Forty Years On, 398 NATURE 91, 91 (1999) 
(recognizing how C.P. Snow’s depiction of two cultures “still resonates” in a world 
“where cultural antipathies are very much alive and kicking”). 
 15. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
470 (1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 990, 1001 (1997). 
 16. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an 
Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). 
 17. See generally Justin McCrary, Joy Milligan & James Cleith Phillips, 
The Ph.D. Rises in American Law Schools, 1960-2011: What Does It Mean for 
Legal Education?, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 543 (2016). 
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Two of this symposium’s articles advance the spirit of the 
landmark Supreme Court Compendium, which has sought since 1994 
to “rectify” the historical “absence of reliable data” enabling 
quantitative analysis of decisionmaking at the highest court of the 
United States.18 Ryan Black and Ryan Owens contest the 
conventional wisdom that attorneys with experience in the Office of 
the Solicitor General are likelier to win cases before the Supreme 
Court.19 Far from the high court, J.J. Prescott, Norman Bishara, and 
Evan Starr have conducted a nationwide survey to gauge the 
experiences and understanding of employment noncompetition 
agreements within the American labor force.20 
Empirical analysis leads each article to a surprising finding of 
no effect. Professors Black and Owens conclude that the “Supreme 
Court is no more likely to rule in favor” of alumni of the Office of 
the Solicitor General than in favor of other attorneys.21 For their part, 
Professors Prescott, Bishara, and Starr find “little credible evidence 
of any relationship between the strength of enforcement” in a state 
and the use of noncompetition agreements by employers in that 
state.22 
Two further papers document different aspects of the impact of 
machine learning on law. Certain mathematical algorithms are more 
readily expressed through computer programming languages than by 
conventional notation.23 Seth Chandler examines the Actuarial Value 
Calculator,24 the spreadsheet that the Obama administration has used 
to implement the “extraordinarily complex” Affordable Care Act of 
2010.25 A spreadsheet is “a directed graph of computations” in which 
quantitative values and computational “programming at each node in 
                                                 
 18. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, 
DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS, at xxi (5th ed. 2012). 
 19. Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, The Success of Former Solicitors 
General in Private Practice: Costly and Unnecessary?, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 325, 
327. 
 20. J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, Understanding 
Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 369. 
 21. Black & Owens, supra note 19, at 327. 
 22. Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 20, at 377. 
 23. See STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE 368 (2002). 
 24. Seth J. Chandler, Regulation by Calculator: Experience Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 465, 467-68. 
 25. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 
(2010); Health Care Education and Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152 (2010). 
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the graph” are depicted in a two- or three-dimensional array.26 
Professor Chandler concludes that the Actuarial Value Calculator 
falls short of the ideal that would inhere in a properly constructed, 
easily implemented, and procedurally transparent approach to 
“regulation by calculator.” 
In his paper on prototypical perceptual semantics, L. Thorne 
McCarthy offers a more theoretical response to the limitations of 
machine learning.27 Nearly two decades ago, Professor McCarty 
recognized that “[l]egal reasoning is a form of theory construction.”28 
At that time, machine learning had not attained sufficient 
sophistication to handle complex legal reasoning.29 Professor 
McCarty now argues that the answers to these “great mysteries of 
cognitive science” and “legal theory” lie in “manifold learning.”30 
Presenting this “very technical” subject “in a more intuitive and 
informal way,”31 Professor McCarty argues that “prototypical 
perceptual semantics,” or the coding of legal prototypes according to 
a probabilistic model and a geometric model, enables the 
development of a logical language for law.32 The recognition that 
such a language for representing legal knowledge can be learned, 
even if it remains momentarily unrealized, fulfills the esthetic if not 
the practical goals of information theory.33 
The third distinct topic represented in this symposium is that of 
legal networks. In one of two papers addressing this subject, Ryan 
Whalen presents an overview of “The Promises and Challenges of 
Legal Network Analysis.”34 Legal networks typically take the form 
of “nodes or vertices joined by links or edges,” with modifications 
“such as weighted links” enabling “those structures [to] contain 
                                                 
 26. Chandler, supra note 24, at 467 n.8. 
 27. L. Thorne McCarty, How to Ground a Language for Legal Discourse in 
a Prototypical Perceptual Semantics, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 511. 
 28. L. Thorne McCarty, Some Arguments About Legal Arguments, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 215, 221 (1997). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. McCarty, supra note 27, at 512. 
 32. See id. at 514; L. Thorne McCarty, How to Ground a Language for 
Legal Discourse in a Prototypical Perceptual Semantics, in FIFTEENTH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 89, 89 (2015). 
 33. See generally ABRAHAM MOLES, INFORMATION THEORY AND ESTHETIC 
PERCEPTION (Joel E. Cohen trans., 1968); FRIEDER NAKE, ÄSTHETIK ALS 
INFORMATIONSVERARBEITUNG [Esthetics as Information Processing] (1974). 
 34. Ryan Whalen, Legal Networks: The Promises and Challenges of Legal 
Network Analysis, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 539. 
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different types of information.”35 Mr. Whalen urges legal scholars “to 
retain more detailed and nuanced data, to analyze those data in more 
sophisticated ways, and to embrace the explanatory power of 
network analyses.”36 
In their contribution to this symposium, Anne Lippert and 
Justin Wedeking use network theory to measure the growth of 
judicial expertise as a response to growing complexity within law.37 
It is widely accepted that complexity within American legal system 
is growing.38 Ms. Lippert and Professor Wedeking have published 
the first effort to measure the expertise of Supreme Court Justices 
according to “the content of their work product—their written 
opinions.”39 Their methodology “generat[es] a new, dynamic 
measure that incorporates network indicators derived from texts of 
Supreme Court opinions.”40 
My own contribution to this symposium applies a more 
traditional set of mathematical tools to a longstanding set of related 
problems in the law of finance.41 The conventional capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) remains the preferred approach in many 
fields of risk management. Behavioral economics has placed the 
CAPM’s neoclassical assumptions under severe pressure. To 
alleviate that tension, I specify a generalized higher-moment capital 
asset pricing model that expresses the emotional impact of odd and 
even moments of statistical distributions. A four-moment version of 
this generalized model explains the common preference for lottery-
like returns from actuarially unfavorable gambles. 
III. FROM ROMANCE TO REALISM  
IN MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF LAW 
The themes and papers comprising this symposium portend a 
future of staggering amounts of data and fierce competition among 
                                                 
 35. Id. at 540. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Anne Lippert & Justin Wedeking, Is Judicial Expertise Dynamic? 
Judicial Expertise, Complex Networks, and Legal Policy, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
567. 
 38. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SIMPLE LAW (2013); Michael J. 
Bommarito II & Daniel Martin Katz, A Mathematical Approach to the Study of the 
United States Code, 389 PHYSICA A 4195 (2010). 
 39. Lippert & Wedeking, supra note 37, at 571. 
 40. Id. 
 41. James Ming Chen, Momentary Lapses of Reason: The Psychophysics of 
Law and Behavior, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 607. 
 Legal Quanta 319 
mathematical models for analyzing that information. We may 
anticipate a parade of imperfectly articulated hypotheses and efforts 
at verification or falsification that will likely lead neither to elegant 
closed-form solutions nor to pathological functions. In our world, 
fundamental forces defy analog definition, invite quantification, and 
still leave ample room to pursue theories of everything.42 Even with 
the most thoughtfully elaborated empirical tests, knowledge about 
law and its underlying logic remains incomplete. “Every year, if not 
every day, we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy 
based upon imperfect knowledge.”43  
The mathematical analysis of law reflects a dialectic of 
romance, frustration, and eventual reconciliation of the internal logic 
of this scientific enterprise with reality. All of science follows a 
familiar progression. “Normal science does not aim at novelties of 
fact or theory and, when successful, finds none.”44 But when 
“fundamental novelties of fact and theory” arise, “[d]iscovery 
commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition 
that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations 
that govern normal science.”45 Once an “awareness of anomaly ha[s] 
lasted so long and penetrated so deep” as to plunge a scientific 
discipline into “a state of growing crisis,” a succeeding “period of 
pronounced professional insecurity” over “the persistent failure of 
the puzzles of normal science” prompts a fruitful search for new 
rules.46 
The metaphysical arc of legal quanta exhibits the seductive 
symmetry of mathematics as a source of beauty and sensory delight. 
Uniquely among human endeavors, mathematics boasts “a beauty 
cold and austere, . . . without any appeal to any part of our weaker 
nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet 
sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the 
greatest art can show. The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the 
sense of being more than Man, which is the touchstone of the highest 
                                                 
 42. See, e.g., GEORGE GREENSTEIN & ARTHUR ZAJONC, THE QUANTUM 
CHALLENGE: MODERN RESEARCH ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 
215 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the inevitably probabilistic nature of quantum 
mechanics). 
 43. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 44. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52 
(2d ed. enlarged, 1970). 
 45. Id. at 52-53. 
 46. See id. at 66-67. 
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excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as poetry.”47 As 
the poet Edna St. Vincent Millay expressed the sentiment: “Euclid 
alone has looked on Beauty bare.”48 What Justice Potter Stewart said 
of obscenity (that he knew it when he saw it)49 finds a parallel in Paul 
Erdős’s definition of mathematical beauty: “Why are numbers 
beautiful? It’s like asking why Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is 
beautiful. If you don’t see why, someone can’t tell you.”50 
The most beautiful mathematical results, in law or elsewhere, 
are those that exhibit “a very high degree of unexpectedness, 
combined with inevitability and economy.”51 Deep mathematical 
beauty subsists in connections that appear at first to be unrelated,52 
but upon further examination reveals “[m]etaphoric combination[s]” 
that “leap[] beyond systematic placement” and “explore[] 
connections that before were unsuspected.”53 The most “useful and 
fertile combinations” of ideas are almost certainly those “which 
present themselves to the mind in a sort of sudden illumination, after 
an unconscious working somewhat prolonged, . . . which seem the 
result of a first impression.”54 
The real world, however, often inconveniently fails to align 
itself with mathematically beautiful models. In the face of anomalous 
results, even the most rigorous, comprehensively elaborated 
approach to legal quanta “can no longer understand [itself] because 
the theories . . . of [a] former age no longer work and the theories of 
                                                 
 47. BERTRAND RUSSELL, The Study of Mathematics, in MYSTICISM AND 
LOGIC, AND OTHER ESSAYS 58, 60 (1988); accord Jim Chen, Truth and Beauty: A 
Legal Translation, 41 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 261, 265 (2010). 
 48. EDNA ST. VINCENT MILLAY, Euclid Alone Has Looked on Beauty Bare, 
in SELECTED POEMS 52 (J.D. McClatchy ed., 2003). 
 49. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“[P]erhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly [defining obscenity]. But I know it 
when I see it . . . .”). 
 50. PAUL HOFFMAN, THE MAN WHO LOVED ONLY NUMBERS: THE STORY OF 
PAUL ERDŐS AND THE SEARCH FOR MATHEMATICAL TRUTH 42 (1998) (quoting 
Erdős); accord KEITH DEVLIN, THE MATH GENE: HOW MATHEMATICAL THINKING 
EVOLVED AND WHY NUMBERS ARE LIKE GOSSIP 140 (2000). 
 51. G.H. HARDY, A MATHEMATICIAN’S APOLOGY 29 (1940). 
 52. See GIAN-CARLO ROTA, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MATHEMATICAL 
BEAUTY 173 (1997). 
 53. JEROME S. BRUNER, The Conditions of Creativity, in ON KNOWING: 
ESSAYS FOR THE LEFT HAND 17, 20 (1963). 
 54. HENRI POINCARÉ, Mathematical Creation, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
SCIENCE: SCIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS, THE VALUE OF SCIENCE, SCIENCE AND METHOD 
383, 391 (George Bruce Halstead trans., 1913). 
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the new age are not yet known.”55 That challenge leaves exactly one 
path forward: to “start afresh as if [we] were newly come into a new 
world.”56 
Financial economics, which supplies the quantitative 
underpinnings of my contribution to this symposium, has undergone 
precisely this sort of scientific crisis. Much of the edifice of 
contemporary mathematical finance—from the capital asset pricing 
model to the Black-Scholes model of option pricing,57 Merton’s 
distance-to-default model of credit risk,58 the original RiskMetrics 
specification of value-at-risk,59 and the Gaussian copula60—is built 
on the Gaussian “normal” distribution.61 
These elegant models—absent elaborate modifications that ruin 
their spare, symmetrical form—are treacherously wrong in their 
reporting of the true nature of risk. Many of the predictive flaws in 
contemporary finance arise from reliance on the mathematically 
elegant but practically unrealistic construction of “beautifully 
Platonic models on a Gaussian base.”62 Gaussian mathematics 
suggests that financial returns are smooth, symmetrical, and 
predictable. In reality, returns are skewed63 and exhibit heavier than 
                                                 
 55. WALKER PERCY, The Delta Factor, in THE MESSAGE IN THE BOTTLE: 
HOW QUEER MAN IS, HOW QUEER LANGUAGE IS, AND WHAT ONE HAS TO DO WITH 
THE OTHER 3, 7 (1986). 
 56. Id. at 7. 
 57. See Fischer Black & Myron S. Scholes, The Pricing of Options and 
Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973); Robert C. Merton, The Theory of 
Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. 141 (1973). 
 58. See Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk 
Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449 (1974). 
 59. See JORGE MINA & JERRY YI XIAO, RETURN TO RISKMETRICS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF A STANDARD (2001); Jeremy Berkowitz & James O’Brien, How 
Accurate Are Value-at-Risk Models at Commercial Banks?, 57 J. FIN. 1093 (2002). 
 60. See ROGER B. NELSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO COPULAS (1999); David X. 
Liu, On Default Correlation: A Copula Function Approach, 9 J. FIXED INCOME 43 
(2000). 
 61. See generally BENOIT B. MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE 
(MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS: A FRACTAL VIEW OF RISK, RUIN, AND REWARD (2004). 
 62. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE 
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 279 (2007). 
 63. See, e.g., JOHN Y. CAMPBELL, ANDREW W. LO & A. CRAIG MACKINLAY, 
THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 17, 81, 172, 498 (1997); Felipe M. 
Aparicio & Javier Estrada, Empirical Distributions of Stock Returns: European 
Securities Markets, 1990-95, 7 EUR. J. FIN. 1 (2001); Geert Bekaert et al., 
Distributional Characteristics of Emerging Market Returns and Asset Allocation, 24 
J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 102 (1998); Pornchai Chunhachinda et al., Portfolio Selection 
and Skewness: Evidence from International Stock Markets, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 
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normal tails.64 The attraction in law and finance to formal elegance 
reflects a love affair with the Gaussian mathematics that has 
traditionally dominated the culture of the natural and social 
sciences.65 Grasping the uncomfortable truth that Gaussian models of 
risk and return belong to “a system of childish illusions” forces our 
infatuation with the seductive symmetry of traditional risk modeling 
to pass “like first love . . . into memory.”66 
This conflict is often portrayed as an irreconcilable struggle 
between the romance of beauty and the realism of truth. Hermann 
Weyl admonished physics (and presumably all other pursuits 
informed by mathematics) that any necessary choice between truth 
and beauty should favor beauty.67 Practical versus philosophical 
“conflict” over “the purpose of scientific inquiry” is “an ancient 
[struggle] in science.”68 Although law ordinary seeks “knowledge . . . 
for purely practical reasons, to predict and control some part of nature 
for society’s benefit,” the knowledge unveiled through mathematical 
analysis “may serve more abstract ends for the contemplative soul” 
and “[u]ncover[] new relationships” that prove “aesthetically 
satisfying” insofar as they “bring[] order to a chaotic world.”69 
This tension is ultimately illusory. Mathematics itself delivers 
an elegant denouement. Mathematical analysis of law is ordinarily 
associated with—indeed, equated with—the application of 
established empirical techniques to ever-growing bodies of legal 
                                                                                                       
143 (1997); Amado Peiró, Skewness in Financial Returns, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 847 
(1999). 
 64. See, e.g., J. Brian Gray & Dan W. French, Empirical Comparisons of 
Distributional Models for Stock Index Returns, 17 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCOUNTING 451 
(1990); Stanley J. Kon, Models of Stock Returns—A Comparison, 39 J. FIN. 147 
(1984); Harry M. Markowitz & Nilufer Usmen, The Likelihood of Various Stock 
Market Return Distributions, Part 1: Principles of Inference, 13 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 207 (1996); Harry M. Markowitz & Nilufer Usmen, The Likelihood 
of Various Stock Market Return Distributions, Part 2: Empirical Results, 13 J. RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 221 (1996); Terence C. Mills, Modelling Skewness and Kurtosis in 
the London Stock Exchange FT-SE Index Return Distributions, 44 STATISTICIAN 323 
(1995). See generally TERENCE C. MILLS, THE ECONOMETRIC MODELLING OF 
FINANCIAL TIME SERIES (2d ed. 1999). 
 65. See TALEB, supra note 62, at 279. 
 66. BERLINSKI, supra note 1, at 239. 
 67. Obituaries, 177 NATURE 457, 458 (1956) (quoting Weyl: “My work 
always tried to unite the true with the beautiful, but when I had to choose one or the 
other, I usually chose the beautiful.”); accord EDWARD O. WILSON, BIOPHILIA 61 
(1984). 
 68. SHARON E. KINGSLAND, MODELING NATURE: EPISODES IN THE HISTORY 
OF POPULATION ECOLOGY 4-5 (1985). 
 69. Id. 
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data. This symposium, however, demonstrates that the enterprise of 
legal quanta enjoys a far broader scope and entertains vastly deeper 
ambitions. In stark “contrast with soulless calculation,” “[g]enuine 
mathematics . . . constitutes one of the finest expressions of the 
human spirit.”70 Admittedly, the “great areas of mathematics”—
including “combinatorics, probability theory, statistics,” and other 
fields of greatest interest to law—”have undoubtedly arisen from our 
experience of the world around us.”71 The law applies these 
mathematical tools “in order to systematize that experience, to give it 
order and coherence, and thereby to enable us to predict and perhaps 
control future events.”72 But it is the mathematical reasoning beneath 
the application of quantitative tools to law, rather than raw real-
world data that propels scientific “progress . . . in response to what 
might be called the mathematician’s apprehension of the natural 
dynamic of mathematics itself.”73 
In other words, mathematics as doing delivers the answers that 
we most pressingly seek—not simply according to the data 
describing the legal world as we find it, but also according to the 
own internal logic of mathematics. “[T]here is nothing in the world 
of mathematics that corresponds to an audience in a concert hall, 
where the passive listen to the active. Happily, mathematicians are 
all doers, not spectators.”74 Through its quest for the “universal 
interest[s]” of the law, legal quanta may yet “catch an echo of the 
infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal 
law.”75 
                                                 
 70. Hilton, The Mathematical Component of a Good Education, supra note 
3, at 151; accord Hilton, Mathematics in Our Culture, supra note 3, at xxi. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. GEORGE M. PHILLIPS, MATHEMATICS IS NOT A SPECTATOR SPORT, at vii 
(2005). 
 75. Holmes, supra note 15, at 478, reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. at 1009. 

